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1 Introduction
The performance of groups, teams and organizations is a common focus of in-
terest for those working in the cognitive (e.g., Hutchins, 1995), computational
(e.g., Kearns, 2012) and social (e.g., Kerr and Tindale, 2004) sciences. It is
also an increasingly popular focus of interest for those working in epistemology.
The sub-discipline of social epistemology, for example, seeks, at least in part,
to understand the way in which issues of social structure, social organization,
social practice and socio-technical interaction affect the collective generation
of epistemically-relevant commodities, such as true belief, knowledge and
understanding (Goldman, 2011). Given that many of our most cherished
intellectual accomplishments (e.g., advances in scientific knowledge) are typi-
cally forged in these crucibles of collective effort, it is vital that we develop a
better (meta-epistemological?) understanding of the forces and factors that
affect the outcomes of socio-epistemic interactions.
It might be thought that the best way to enhance the epistemic per-
formance of social groups would be to enhance the cognitive or epistemic
capabilities of the individual group members. This makes intuitive sense, since
it would seem that by improving the cognitive abilities of the individual agent
(e.g., by enhancing their powers of mnemonic recall or improving their ability
to engage in reason-respecting chains of thought) we thereby provide the basis
for improved performance at the collective level (i.e., we enhance the problem-
solving and decision-making capabilities of the group itself). In the current
chapter, I want to present an alternative view of collective performance that is
captured by the notion of ‘mandevillian intelligence’.1 The term ‘mandevillian
intelligence’ names a specific form of collective intelligence in which certain
kinds of (individual-level) cognitive and epistemic properties are seen to be
causally-relevant to the expression of intelligent behavior at the collective
level. In particular, the properties of interest in mandevillian intelligence are
the properties of individual agents that are typically denigrated as cognitive
and epistemic ‘vices’. These include cognitive processing limitations (e.g.,
limitations in attentional capacity), cognitive shortcomings (e.g., forgetting)
and cognitive biases (e.g., confirmation bias). What makes these properties
vices is that they are generally seen to undermine the performance of the indi-
vidual on a variety of cognitive and epistemic tasks. With these clarifications
1Mandevillian intelligence is named after the Anglo-Dutch philosopher and economist,
Bernard Mandeville, who wrote about the causal link between private (individual) vice
and public (collective) benefits.
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in place, we can define mandevillian intelligence as follows:
Mandevillian Intelligence
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence
in which cognitive and epistemic properties that are typically seen
as vices at the individual level can, on occasion, play a positive
functional role in supporting the emergence of intelligent behaviour
at the collective level.
There are few points that are worth noting about this definition. Firstly,
mandevillian intelligence is cast as a specific form of collective intelligence.
As such, it only applies to situations where the term ‘collective intelligence’
is itself deemed to be applicable. We do not, therefore, have mandevillian
intelligence if we observe the presence of cognitive vice (or virtue), but we
do not observe collective intelligence.2 Secondly, mandevillian intelligence
is only applicable to those situations in which collective success is causally
linked to individual properties that are properly labeled as cognitive or
epistemic vices. If the relevant properties fail to qualify as vices (from
the perspective of individual cognitive functioning), then we do not have
mandevillian intelligence, and this is so irrespective of whether or not we have
collective intelligence. Finally, it is important to note that there is nothing in
the definition of mandevillian intelligence that would lead us to conclude that
individual forms of cognitive/epistemic vice will inexorably lead to positive
outcomes at the collective level. It is possible that individual cognitive vices
will undermine or enhance collective performance depending on the specific
context in which collective cognitive processing occurs.
The value of the concept of mandevillian intelligence is it that forces us
to acknowledge the potential role of individual vice in securing collective
forms of cognitive success. With the concept of mandevillian intelligence to
hand, we can thus question the extent to which the seemingly negative or
undesirable cognitive properties of individual agents (broadly construed as
cognitive vices) should always be seen as detrimental to group performance.
Indeed, mandevillian intelligence encourages us to entertain the possibility
that individual cognitive vices may, on occasion, provide a productive route to
collective forms of ‘cognitive virtue’. In other words, mandevillian intelligence
2It is thus a mistake to regard situations where individual virtues undermine collective
intelligence as genuine instances of mandevillian intelligence. This is because the relevant
situations are not ones that can be seen as indicative of collective intelligence.
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enables us to see how individual vices may result in group-level properties
that enable the group to discover or track the truth.
The main aim of the current chapter is to introduce the notion of man-
devillian intelligence into the epistemological literature. In particular, I will
attempt to sketch an initial vision concerning the potential relevance of man-
devillian intelligence to contemporary epistemology. Obviously, given that
mandevillian intelligence is presented as a specific form of collective intelli-
gence, the idea already has a natural affinity with the branch of epistemology
known as social epistemology (Goldman and Whitcomb, 2011; Haddock et al,
2010). Beyond this, however, mandevillian intelligence may also strike a
chord with popular approaches in individualistic analytic epistemology. This
is because issues of vice and virtue, which lie at the heart of mandevillian
intelligence, are a major focus of philosophical attention for what is known as
virtue epistemology (Greco and Turri, 2012). Mandevillian intelligence seems
to be of crucial relevance, here, because it suggests that a virtue-theoretic
conception of socially-produced knowledge (or collective knowledge) might
need to appeal to the role of intellectual vice as much as it does the role
of intellectual virtue. There are also reasons to believe that a considera-
tion of mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the design and evaluation of
socio-technical systems, especially those that have, as their primary goal,
the generation or maintenance of collective knowledge. With the advent of
the World Wide Web, such forms of ‘socio-epistemic machinery’ are increas-
ingly commonplace. Prominent examples include the online encyclopedia,
Wikipedia (see Fallis, 2011), as well as a variety of so-called citizen science
systems (Khatib et al, 2011; Lintott et al, 2008). Given the potential rele-
vance of contemporary epistemology to the design of these systems, it seems
that mandevillian intelligence may have as much traction with the emerging
sub-discipline of applied epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming) as it
does with the already well-established sub-disciplines of social epistemology
and virtue epistemology.
2 Virtue Epistemology: Reliabilism, Respon-
sibilism and Virtue Relativism
As a means of better understanding the epistemological relevance of mandev-
illian intelligence, it helps to have a better understanding of the significance
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of vice and virtue in contemporary epistemology. The main point of interest,
here, is what is known as virtue epistemology (Greco and Turri, 2012). Virtue
epistemology names an approach to understanding knowledge that is rooted
in the intellectual virtues, where these are understood as the properties of
an agent that enable that agent to track the truth. The thing that makes
something an intellectual virtue from an epistemological perspective is thus
its truth conduciveness, or its tendency to lead to a preponderance of true
(as opposed to false) beliefs.
A point of agreement between all virtue epistemologists concerns the
role of intellectual virtue in underwriting claims regarding positive epistemic
status. Virtue epistemologists have, however, tended to think of the intellec-
tual virtues themselves in different ways. It is, in fact, this difference that
enables us to distinguish between two major theoretical camps in contempo-
rary virtue epistemology, namely, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism
(Baehr, 2006; Battaly, 2008; Greco, 2002). According to virtue reliabilists,
the intellectual virtues are to be understood as cognitive abilities or powers.
Examples include memory, perception, and various forms of reasoning (e.g.,
inductive and deductive reasoning). Given that we can regard these abilities
or powers as cognitive faculties, virtue reliabilists are sometimes said to em-
brace a faculty-based conception of intellectual virtue (e.g., Greco, 2002). In
contrast to virtue reliabilists, virtue responsibilists see the intellectual virtues
as something akin to personality traits. Examples, in this case, include
open-mindedness, tenacity, attentiveness, intellectual courage, carefulness,
thoroughness, and so on. Given the sense in which these properties corre-
spond to enduring cognitive traits, reflecting (perhaps) an agent’s cognitive
character,3 virtue responsibilists are sometimes said to adopt a trait-based
conception of intellectual virtue (see Figure 1).
Based on the foregoing characterization of virtue reliabilism and virtue
responsibilism, it is easy to think of vice and virtue as fixed and immutable
3The notion of cognitive character also surfaces in the context of virtue reliabilist
approaches to knowledge (see Greco, 1999). In the current context, cognitive character
consists of both faculty virtues and trait virtues (see Figure 1). It is however, important
to note that virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists are likely to view the notion of
cognitive character in somewhat different ways. From a virtue reliabilist perspective, an
agent’s cognitive character is to be understood in terms of an “integrated web of stable
and reliable belief-forming processes” (Pritchard, 2010, p. 136). For virtue responsibilists,
in contrast, the notion of cognitive character is likely to refer to the dispositions of the
agent to cognize in particular ways, given certain situations.
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Faculty Virtue Trait Virtue 
Virtue  
Reliabilism 
Virtue 
Responsibilism 
appeals-to appeals-to 
Intellectual Humility 
Intellectual Courage 
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Curiosity 
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Perception 
Induction 
Deduction 
is-property-of is-property-of 
Epistemic Agent 
Cognitive 
Character 
Figure 1: Virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism can be seen to appeal to distinct
conceptions of intellectual virtue. Both kinds of intellectual virtue, in this case, are
seen to form part of what is called an agent’s ‘cognitive character’. Triangles in this
diagram symbolize taxonomic (or ‘sub-type-of’) relationships, while diamonds symbolize
compositional (or ‘part-of’) relationships.
aspects of an agent’s cognitive character. It is, in other words, easy to think
that examples of vice (e.g., a poor memory) and virtue (e.g., open-mindedness)
are always to be seen as vices and virtues, irrespective of the specific context
in which these aspects of agent character are evaluated. This seems entirely
appropriate; for why assume that something like a poor memory should, in
some cases, be regarded as a vice and, in other cases, as a virtue. Similarly,
it seems odd to think that a trait such as open-mindedness could ever be
something other than an intellectual virtue: surely, it is always better to be
open-minded as opposed to dogmatic, particularly if one’s goal is to increase
one’s chances of believing the truth.
But now notice something important. Recall that what makes something
an intellectual virtue in virtue epistemology is its reliability—the fact that it
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leads to a preponderance of true rather than false beliefs. Intellectual vices,
on the other hand, are properties of an epistemic agent that are generally
seen to be unreliable (i.e., they do not result in a preponderance of true
beliefs). The reason why we regard open-mindedness as a virtue, therefore,
has something to do with the fact that open-mindedness will, in general, yield
a greater number of true beliefs, as opposed to a trait like dogmatism, which
will yield a preponderance of false beliefs. But what if the reliability of these
aspects of agent cognitive character were to vary, in a systematic way, with
different kinds of belief-forming context? In this case, it is at least possible
that a vice in one context of evaluation might have a more virtuous feel to it
in another context of evaluation.
It is here that we come face-to-face with the notion of ‘virtue relativism’.
Virtue relativism is the idea that our notions of vice and virtue are relative
to specific evaluative contexts. Our judgements of vice and virtue thus
exhibit a degree of context-specificity: what we see as a vice or virtue is
largely determined by the sort of context in which such judgements are made.
Such issues lie at the heart of mandevillian intelligence. In this case, the
context of evaluation (the context in which we make judgements concerning
vice and virtue) relates to whether our focus is on an individual epistemic
agent or a larger collection of such agents, for example, a socio-epistemic
system (Goldman, 2011) or an ‘epistemic group agent’ (Palermos, 2015).4 In
particular, when we apply the notion of mandevillian intelligence to virtue
epistemology, the claim is that our sense of what is and what is not an
intellectual vice varies according to whether our attention is focused on an
individual agent (the traditional focus of analytic epistemology) or a collection
of such agents (the traditional focus of social epistemology). A cognitive
trait or faculty that has a distinctly vice-like feel to it at the individual level
of analysis, may thus, when studied in a more collective context, emerge
as something rather more virtuous. In most cases, we can make sense of
this by focusing our attention on the way in which a cognitive property (i.e.,
a trait or faculty) contributes to the reliability of a belief-forming process.
Thus, when we consider the reliability of a cognitive trait or faculty at the
individual level of analysis, we may observe that a trait such as dogmatism
(i.e., an irrational adherence to one’s views) is to be regarded as a cognitive
4Epistemic group agents are defined as “groups of individuals who exist and gain
knowledge in virtue of a shared common cognitive character that primarily consists of a
distributed cognitive ability” (Palermos and Pritchard, 2013, p. 115).
6
vice. We may be perfectly justified in making this sort of judgement, since
dogmatism may indeed undermine the ability of an individual agent to believe
what is true (i.e., at the individual level dogmatism is to be regarded as a
genuine intellectual vice). When our perspective shifts, however, and we view
things from a more social perspective, we may find that individual forms of
dogmatism play a productive role in yielding collective forms of epistemic
success (see Section 3.2). Indeed, it may very well be the case that a degree
of dogmatism on the part of individual agents is necessary to ensure the
reliability of the socio-epistemic system with respect to the generation or
discovery of true beliefs.5 It is in precisely this sense that we can see the
notion of mandevillian intelligence as appealing to a particular form of virtue
relativism.
3 My Vice, Our Virtue
Claims regarding mandevillian intelligence would, if true, seem to have a
number of implications for contemporary epistemology. Obviously, given
the centrality of vice and virtue to virtue epistemology, we might expect
the notion of mandevillian intelligence to inform philosophical debates con-
cerning the nature of knowledge. This seems particularly so when it comes
to virtue-theoretic conceptions of group or collective knowledge (Palermos
and Pritchard, 2013; Palermos, 2015). In this case, a collection of individual
agents is deemed to function as a form of doxastic machinery, generating
belief states that (hopefully) succeed in tracking the truth. Looking at such
socio-epistemic systems from the perspective of virtue epistemology, we might
be inclined to view collective knowledge as grounded in the intellectual virtues
of the individual agents that comprise the system. Such a view seems to
be called into question, however, if we accept the notion of mandevillian
intelligence (see Section 4.3).
The implications of mandevillian intelligence may also be felt in the context
of what is called applied epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming). In
this case, the objective is often to evaluate the epistemic impact of different
5This does not mean that all individuals within the collective ensemble are required to
be dogmatic. In many cases, a mixture of individuals possessing both positive and negative
traits is likely to be required. Support for this claim is provided by empirical research
showing that agent diversity is sometimes crucial to collective forms of cognitive success
(Hong and Page, 2004; Muldoon, 2013; Page, 2007).
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forms of social or technological intervention. Inasmuch as we embrace the
notion of mandevillian intelligence, it seems we may need to accept that
what is epistemically good for the community (in the form of a specific social
or technological intervention) may not always be so good for the epistemic
standing of the community members (see Section 4.1).
There are thus a variety of reasons to think that mandevillian intelligence
is of broad relevance to a number of areas in contemporary epistemology. But
why should we buy into the notion of mandevillian intelligence in the first
place? What evidence is there to suggest that the notion of mandevillian
intelligence denotes a real phenomenon that is worthy of further epistemo-
logical consideration. In this section, I will review a number of strands of
research that provide an initial response to this question.
3.1 Collective Intelligence and Collective Search
Mandevillian intelligence, recall, is defined as a specific form of collective
intelligence (see Section 1). This is important, because from an empirical
perspective it is common to see collective intelligence as a form of collective
search through a complex space of (e.g.) doxastic possibilities (e.g., Mason,
2013). Consider, or example, the case of collective or team sensemaking (Klein
et al, 2010; Smart and Sycara, 2013). As a team of individuals strives to make
sense of some ambiguous body of information, they will each start to form
beliefs about the focal object, event or situation. Such beliefs can be seen
as tracing trajectories through a multi-dimensional space of interpretational
possibilities, each of which can be judged in terms of its relative distance
to a particular point in the search (or problem) space that represents the
global optimum, i.e., the set of beliefs that corresponds to the most accurate
interpretation of the target state-of-affairs. The performance of the team
members, in this case, can be judged in terms of their ability to discover (and,
in some cases, converge) on the global optimum. A similar characterization
could be made in respect of the process of scientific discovery. Here, a
community of scientists are typically engaged in a collective effort to generate
ideas and evaluate them with respect to the available evidence. The hope is
that as the community explores this space of ideational possibilities they will
(eventually) discover regions or points within the space that mark out major
advances in scientific knowledge and understanding.
Relative to this vision of collective intelligence as a form of collective search,
we can view mandevillian intelligence as a specific form of collective intelligence
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that is apparent whenever individual vices play a positive functional role in
supporting a collective search effort. In other words, we confront a case of
mandevillian intelligence whenever individual vices contribute to the ability
of a community to discover optimal solutions (e.g., doxastic states that closely
approximate the nature of reality). These vices, we can assume, work to shape
the flow of information and influence within an agent community in such a
way as to alter the dynamics of the collective search process, enhancing the
probability that the community (as a whole) will discover the best available
solution. Transposing all this to the epistemic domain, we should, I suggest,
see mandevillian intelligence as a form of collective intelligence in which
individual vices enhance the reliability of a community to discover (and
sometimes converge on) those beliefs (i.e., a region of some possibly multi-
dimensional doxastic space) that provides the community with an appropriate
cognitive grip on reality.6
The value of conceptualizing mandevillian intelligence in this way is that it
helps to establish contact with an important body of empirical work concerning
the optimal organization of multi-agent ensembles as a means of improving
various aspects of the collective search process. Such work appears under a
variety of headings based on the complexity (i.e., simple vs. complex) and
nature (i.e., biological vs. computational) of the focal group of agents. Work
involving relatively simply agents thus includes work on swarm intelligence
(Bonabeau et al, 1999; Garnier et al, 2007; Kennedy et al, 2001) (biological
agents) and particle swarm optimization (Poli et al, 2007) (computational
agents), whereas work involving more complex agents includes work on human
subjects (Mason et al, 2008) (biological agents) and cognitive architectures
(Reitter and Lebiere, 2012) (computational agents).
One of the key insights to emerge from work in these areas is the importance
of balancing what is called exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). In
general, the agent community needs to ensure that it engages in a sufficient
degree of exploration of the search space, avoiding the temptation to converge
on those regions of the search space marked out by early discoveries. The
problem is that, especially in complex search spaces characterized by rugged
solution landscapes, precipitant forms of inter-agent communication can lead
to premature convergence on sub-optimal solutions, thereby blocking the
search for the global optimum. This is a particular problem in situations
6In practice, of course, such forms of reliability will always be judged relative to a set of
resource constraints relating to (e.g.) time, cost, money, effort and so on.
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where early successes are of little value in terms of illuminating the path to
the best outcome. It is for this reason that attempts to improve the efficiency
of inter-agent communication by, for example, increasing the density of the
agent communication network, tend to compromise performance on collective
cognitive tasks (Hutchins, 1991; Lazer and Friedman, 2007; Mason et al, 2008;
Smart et al, 2010; Zollman, 2010). The problem is that certain kinds of
communication (or social) network structure (e.g., fully-connected networks)
provide rapid feedback (possibly to all agents) about the best solutions on
offer. This has the unfortunate consequence of causing all agents to converge
on regions of the search space that are possibly far removed from the actual
location of the global optimum (see Lazer and Friedman, 2007, for a more
in-depth discussion).
One way of addressing this unfortunate state-of-affairs is to reduce the
opportunities that agents have to communicate information during the search
process. By reducing the opportunities for communication, we alter the
temporal dynamics of information flow and influence, retarding the rate at
which information can propagate within the agent community, and thereby
reducing the possibility of premature forms of cognitive convergence. One
way of restricting agent communication is, of course, to alter the physical
structure of the agent communication network itself. By reducing the number
of channels for inter-agent communication, changes to network structure often
succeed in ensuring that a felicitous degree of cognitive (e.g., doxastic) diversity
is maintained within the agent community. It is for this reason that we can
view alterations to network structure as a form of ‘diversity maintenance
mechanism’; i.e., as a mechanism that works to maintain cognitive diversity
within a community of problem-solving agents.
Changes to the physical structure of a communication network are not,
however, the only way to alter the flow of information and influence within
a community of agents. We can also look to agent-level characteristics as
a means of gating and routing information through the collective ensemble.
Individual agents, in this case, can be seen as working to control the time-
variant ‘effective connectivity’ of the communication network (see Friston,
2011) (i.e., the set of connections that are actively engaged in the transfer
of information between nodal elements—in this case, agents). As a means
of illustrating this, imagine that we bring together a group of (human)
individuals to perform a collective sensemaking task. Imagine, also, that
these individuals have no prior experience of working together and are thus
unknown to each other. The level of trust between the agents is, we may
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assume, relatively low, and each agent will, as a result, be initially reluctant
to wholeheartedly embrace the information supplied by other agents (at least
during the early stages of the task). The result is that the ‘effective’ influence
of communicated information, in terms of its ability to promote a shift in
agent-level cognitive states, is limited. In fact, it may very well be the case
that the informational influence is so low as to transform what is (at the
structural level) a fully-connected network into something that, at least from
the perspective of effective connectivity, looks a lot more austere (e.g., a
disconnected network). It is in this sense that we can see a role for inter-agent
distrust (an agent-level property) in shaping the effective connectivity of an
agent communication network. Crucially, we can see this agent-mediated
transformation of effective connectivity as a form of diversity maintenance
mechanism that helps (just as do changes to the structural connectivity of
the network) to prevent premature convergence on sub-optimal solutions.
In the case of human epistemic communities, there are a variety of psycho-
cognitive factors that are poised to play the same sort of functional role as
that played by inter-agent (i.e., social) distrust. These include the tendency
of individuals to hoard information, a lack of willingness to cooperate with
others, a vulnerability to copying/transmission errors, and a steadfast (and
seemingly irrational) commitment to one’s own ideas and methods. What is
important to note, here, is that these factors are often cast in a somewhat
negative light: they are often seen as shortcomings, flaws or vulnerabilities that
need to be addressed by all manner of social, pedagogical and technological
interventions. It is here, then, that we begin to creep up on the notion of
mandevillian intelligence. In particular, we can begin to see at least one
of the ways in which a set of vice-like characteristics, pitched at the level
of individual agents, might make a positive contribution to the cognitive
processing capabilities of a collective ensemble. Relative to our intuitions
regarding the importance and value of cooperation, sharing, trust and accurate
information transmission, it might be all too easy to take a rather dim view
of distrust, hoarding, deception and social withdrawal. What the notion of
mandevillian intelligence gives us, however, is an alternative way of looking
at these individual, agent-level properties: it enables us to see agent-level
characteristics as playing an important (i.e., explanatorily salient) role in
helping to align the structure of the collective search effort with the demands
imposed by the nature of the search problem.
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3.2 Dogmatism
While a failure to trust others is hardly the most celebrated of human
characteristics, it is not something that is typically regarded as an intellectual
vice, at least by virtue epistemologists. Intellectual vices, we have seen, are
those properties of an agent’s cognitive character that undermine the extent
to which an agent’s beliefs align themselves with facts about the world. A
vice is thus something that hinders an agent’s ability to believe the truth.
Given that it is far from clear that the kinds of properties we have been
talking about thus far—i.e., distrust, hoarding and deception—really do
undermine the truth-tracking capabilities of individual agents, there seems
little reason for virtue epistemologists to be convinced about the relevance of
mandevillian intelligence to epistemological theorizing. In order to make the
case for mandevillian intelligence, we therefore need to focus on agent-level
properties that are widely recognized as intellectual vices and show how such
properties can work to the good of an epistemic community.
With this in mind, consider the results of an important study by Zoll-
man (2010). Zollman was interested in the factors that work to facilitate
cognitive diversity within a scientific community, enabling the community to
more fully explore a space of possibilities before converging on a particular out-
come. One way of achieving such diversity is, as we have seen, to manipulate
the structural configuration of the agent communication network and thereby
constrain the opportunities that agents have to exchange information (and
influence one another). But what if we are unable to change the structure of
the network. In this situation, it seems as though there is nothing to prevent
precipitant forms of information sharing, and we might thus expect the agent
community to prematurely converge on some sub-optimal part of the search
space.
Although restricting the flow of information (e.g., the dissemination of
research results) constitutes one means of avoiding premature convergence
in this situation, Zollman identifies another way. If we are stuck with a
community of well-connected scientists, diversity can still be maintained, he
suggests, if (at least some of) the scientists exhibit a dogmatic adherence to
their own ideas and methods. By being dogmatic, a scientist is essentially
insulating themselves from the influence exerted by conflicting evidence.
The result, Zollman suggests, is that the scientific community manages to
maintain the sort of cognitive diversity that is required to ensure that scientific
consensus, when it does finally emerge, is successful in settling on the truth.
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By appealing to the role of dogmatism in maintaining a sufficient degree of
cognitive diversity, Zollman (2010) is clearly identifying a positive functional
role for aspects of human cognitive character that are typically seen in a
somewhat negative light. From an individual perspective, it seems highly
unlikely that an irrational adherence to one’s own ideas could be of epistemic
value, especially when ideas with seemingly better evidential support are on
offer. Nevertheless, such forms of individual vice can, it seems, work to the
good of an epistemic community by reducing the impact of misleading evidence
and sustaining the search for new ideas, methods and information. The
upshot is that a moderate amount of individual vice—in this case, intellectual
dogmatism—seems to play an important role in striking an effective balance
between exploration and exploitation. By exhibiting a steadfast commitment
to one’s own ideas, individual epistemic agents (e.g., scientists) look to be
behaving in a decidedly sub-optimal manner. However, such shortcomings
are only really apparent at the individual level of analysis. At the collective
level, individual vice seems to play a much more positive role in facilitating
collective forms of cognitive and epistemic success.
There are, in fact, a variety of ways in which intellectual dogmatism might
work to the epistemic good of a community. Most obviously, a resistance
to social and informational influence helps to maintain a degree of cognitive
diversity within a community of problem solvers. We can thus see dogmatism
as something of an intellectual safeguard against pernicious forms of cognitive
convergence and consensus, especially in situations where it is important to
avoid the premature abandonment of potentially promising lines of enquiry.
Another way in which dogmatism might earn its collective cognitive keep is
via the social scaffolding of intellectual activities. Consider, for example, how
the maintenance of marginal theories and ideas might help to concentrate
and reinforce the empirical and deliberative efforts of those who embrace
the majority view. Here, the presence of minority views (even if those views
are incorrect!) is helping to motivate others to develop their own views
and make them even more convincing (see Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983). In
the absence of such opposition, it is perhaps unlikely that there would be
sufficient motivation to engage in these additional forms of intellectual effort.7
7Something along these lines was recognized by Karl Popper (1994). With respect to
dogmatism, Popper (1994) notes that: “...a limited amount of dogmatism is necessary for
progress. Without a serious struggle for survival in which the old theories are tenaciously
defended, none of the competing theories can show their mettle—that is, their explanatory
power and their truth content” (p. 16).
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Finally, note that by preserving some degree of diversity within an epistemic
community, dogmatism plays a potentially important role in opening the door
to further diversity. In situations where all the members of a community have
settled on a particular view, it may be difficult for those with a dissenting
voice to pluck up sufficient courage to challenge the status quo. Here, the
presence of one or two dogmatic individuals may help to establish a baseline
level of dissent that helps to free the timid champions of competing views
from the pressures of social conformity.
Note that in many of these cases there is no reason for the dogmatist
to actually believe the truth—it may very well be the case that what the
dogmatist believes to be the truth is, in fact, false. This does not mean,
however, that they cannot play a useful and productive role in enabling the
community as a whole to succeed in their truth-seeking efforts.8
3.3 Cognitive Bias
Dogmatism provides one means by which cognitive diversity could be main-
tained within an epistemic community. Another route to cognitive diversity
may have its origins in our susceptibility to cognitive bias. Consider, for
example, Solomon’s (1992) analysis of the plate tectonics revolution in geology.
Solomon suggests that the eventual success of theories relating to continental
drift owed a great deal to a set of cognitive heuristics and biases that are
often seen as a threat to rational forms of thought and action. Contrary
to what might be expected, Solomon argues that it was the departure from
normative standards of rationality that made possible the intellectual success
of the larger geological community:
...during the geological revolution, the phenomena of bias and
belief perseverance [sic.] were responsible for much of the distri-
bution of research commitment. This distribution facilitated the
various directions of research effort that went into the geological
revolution. So the cognitive heuristics of availability, salience and
representativeness had desirable epistemic effects in the geological
community. (Solomon, 1992, p. 452)
8Note how all this this encourages us to embrace a form of ‘epistemic tolerance’ to those
who we would otherwise seek to censure, denounce and condemn (Robert Clowes, personal
communication, October 7, 2016). Inasmuch as we accept the possibility of mandevillian
intelligence, we are able to see the potential epistemic value of those individuals who are
(without doubt) the purveyors of false beliefs.
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Crucially, for our purposes, the kinds of factors that Solomon draws
attention to in accounting for the success of the geological community are
factors that are typically denigrated as forms of intellectual vice, or at least
as factors that might work to undermine the epistemic integrity of individual
agents. Here, then, we encounter an additional reason to think that the
notion of mandevillian intelligence has a substantive impact on contemporary
epistemological debates relating to both individual analytic epistemology
(most notably, virtue epistemology) and social epistemology. Whereas our
earlier discussion of dogmatism focused on a form of vice that lies in the
philosophical cross-hairs of virtue responsibilist theorizing, we are now pre-
sented with a vice that seems to be of greater interest and relevance to
virtue reliabilism. In particular, a susceptibility to cognitive bias seems to
represent something of a failing with regard to the proper functioning of our
cognitive machinery—it is, at least, something that seems to pose a threat to
our cognitively-grounded truth-tracking capabilities. The value of Solomon’s
contribution, in this respect, is that it helps to highlight the explanatory
significance of degraded forms of individual cognitive ability in underwriting
the epistemic accomplishments of a larger epistemic community.
Another significant contribution to this debate comes from a consideration
of a specific kind of cognitive bias, namely, confirmation bias (Nickerson,
1998). Confirmation bias is almost universally seen as a cognitive vice, and
this is reflected in the many (ongoing) attempts to develop technological
interventions that aim to minimize or eliminate the bias (e.g., Convertino
et al, 2008). A more positive appraisal of confirmation bias is, however,
possible if we see confirmation bias as (again) a form of diversity maintenance
mechanism. Thus while confirmation bias might appear (genuinely so) as
an individual shortcoming (an individual vice), the bias can also, at least
in some circumstances, work to ensure the optimal distribution of available
cognitive resources within a community of epistemic agents. In order to help
us understand this, imagine that we have a group of individuals who are
trying to make sense of some complex state-of-affairs. Providing that we have
a sufficient degree of cognitive diversity (represented as differences in beliefs,
opinions, theories, approaches, or whatever) between the agents at the outset
of the problem-solving endeavour, then we can assume that each agent will
(under the influence of confirmation bias) attempt to marshal support for their
own argumentative positions (see Mercier and Sperber, 2011). The result
is that each agent, operating under the influence of confirmation bias, will
devote considerable effort to processing a specific subset of the information
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(e.g., empirical data) that is available within the relevant problem space. This
helps to promote the distribution of collective cognitive resources with respect
to the target problem. Given that cognitive assets (as well as other resources
such as time) are invariably limited, it helps if each individual agent engages
in a thorough exploration of a specific and distinct part of the problem space
rather than have all agents attempt to cognitively engage with the entire space.
Not only is this latter strategy likely to be infeasible, it is also likely to be
highly ineffective since each agent will only be able to process information at a
rather superficial level. By contrast, when each agent is attempting to bolster
support for their own argumentative position or preferred interpretation, they
will be encouraged to restrict their attention to a much more limited body
of information (specifically, that body of information that is consistent with
their own particular point of view) and process this information to a much
greater depth than would otherwise be the case.
When we look at this state-of-affairs from an epistemological standpoint,
the behaviour of the individual agents looks far from optimal. This is particu-
larly so when we look at the situation through the lens of virtue epistemology.
In this case, the biased nature of each of the individual agents seems to
undermine their status as genuine knowers. A susceptibility to confirma-
tion bias thus seems to undermine the reliability of the individual agent in
terms of their ability to track the truth, and it is therefore difficult, under a
virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge, to see the individual agent as the
appropriate target of knowledge ascriptions. Note that even if a particular
agent, in this situation, turns out to believe the truth, it is far from clear that
a virtue reliabilist conception of knowledge will allow us to make any sort of
positive statement about the epistemic standing of the agent. In fact, given
the nature of the belief forming processes employed by the agents, it seems
more a question of luck (as opposed to cognitive ability) that any individ-
ual agent will hit on the correct answer.9 Individual epistemic successes, if
there are any, will thus be seen to violate an epistemic anti-luck condition
(Pritchard, 2009, 2012), and this is almost universally regarded as inimical
to knowledge attribution. The result is that we seem to confront a curious
state-of-affairs in which a susceptibility to cognitive bias undermines positive
epistemic standing in the case of individual agents; however, that very same
9Much will obviously depend, here, on where an agent happens to focus their intellectual
efforts at the outset of the search process. However, this may be down to luck as much as
anything else.
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susceptibility to bias underwrites the intellectually virtuous character of the
larger, multi-agent ensemble. It is after all plausible that the reliability of the
agent community (i.e., the ability of the community to discover the truth)
is rooted in the fact that the relevant search space has been explored to the
greatest extent possible, and such forms of exploratory effort seem to be best
enabled by ensuring an appropriate distribution of individual-level cognitive
resources. We might therefore judge whether a community can be said to
know something on the basis of whether the community’s doxastic outputs
stem from the exercise of a form of collective cognitive ability, a form of
ability that, in this case, appears to be grounded in the biased nature of the
individual members’ belief-forming processes.
3.4 Impure Motives
In addition to cognitive traits (e.g., intellectual dogmatism) and cognitive
faculties (e.g., cognitive bias), agent motivations have sometimes been shown
to yield mandevillian-like effects. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of this
is apparent in the philosophy of science literature. Here, there has been
a concerted effort to understand the ways in which socio-cultural factors,
such as economic rewards and credit assignment policies, influence decisions
regarding (e.g.) what scientific topics are worth investigating. A particular
focus of attention has been the factors that prevent scientists from converging
on the same area of investigation. This has been deemed to constitute a
problem, since, if we assume that all scientists are perfectly rational and care
only about the epistemic payoffs of their endeavours (which seems like the
virtuous thing do), then there seems little reason to suspect that scientists
will choose to distribute their scientific efforts across a range of different focus
areas. The result, as noted by Thagard (1993), is a potentially ruinous retreat
from novelty:
...if all scientists made identical judgements about the quality of
available theories and the value of possible research programs,
science would become homogenous. Novel ideas and potentially
acceptable new theories would never be developed sufficiently to
the point where they would in fact become rationally acceptable
by all. (p. 65)
In order to achieve an effective division of labour, it therefore seems that
the interests of scientists need to guided by more than just epistemic criteria.
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It is here that an appeal to sullied motives comes into play. For if we reject
the image of scientists as epistemically pure-minded individuals and instead
adopt the (surely far more plausible) image of scientists as preoccupied with
a range of non-epistemic concerns (e.g., economic rewards, academic prestige
and social status), then it seems natural to assume that scientists will avoid
attempting to hit epistemic pay dirt in those parts of the intellectual landscape
that are already the focus of significant scientific mining operations. It is
this general idea that underlies claims about the value of sullied motives
in enabling a community to achieve its epistemic ends (see Kitcher, 1993).
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) thus suggest that:
...scientist’s micromotives can look epistemically impure or short-
sighted, yet these motives can actually help the community as a
whole make rapid progress toward finding out the truth. Thus a
core tenant [sic.] of strategic models about the division of cognitive
labor is that what is epistemically good for individuals may differ
from what is epistemically good for the community. (pp. 226-227)
There is clearly something of a mandevillian ring to all this. But where
should we seek to locate research on agent motivations within the theoretical
framework of virtue epistemology? The best answer to that question, to
my mind, is to see work on agent motivation (and perhaps emotion10) as
appealing to a virtue responsibilist conception of knowledge. The reason for
this, I suggest, is that agent motivations are better conceived of as a form of
‘cognitive trait’ than a ‘cognitive faculty’. Motivations are, at least, closer to
the sort of characteristics targeted by virtue responsibilists than the sort of
characteristics targeted by virtue reliabilists. Indeed, virtue responsibilists
like Zagzebski (1996) often appeal to the role of agent motivations in guiding
evaluations of epistemic standing. For Zagzebski (1996), all intellectual
virtues are to be understood as acquired traits of character that involve both
a motivational component and a reliability component:
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the
motivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A
would (probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving
the end of the A motivation, and is such that the agent acquires
a true belief...through these features of the act. (p. 270)
10Morton (2014) discusses a range of epistemic emotions within a broadly mandevillian
framework.
18
There is, however, a potentially significant difference between agent motiva-
tions and agent cognitive traits. Motivations, I suggest, are the sorts of things
that are deeply affected by a complex nexus of social, cultural, economic,
legislative and organizational influences. It is thus relatively easy to see how
the motivations of individual scientists might be shaped and sustained as a
result of the delicate interplay between socio-cultural factors, the structure
of economic rewards, and the kind of ethical norms and values associated
with scientific practice. It is here that issues of mandevillian intelligence start
to dovetail with issues of social policy and the socio-economic scaffolding of
epistemic virtue. For inasmuch as we accept the idea that individual vice
can, on occasion, play a productive role in serving the collective epistemic
good, then we will need to consider to what extent socio-economic and socio-
political interventions should be judged solely on the basis of their potential
to exacerbate individual forms of intellectual vice. It seems that, at least in
some cases, a form of intervention might earn its keep solely on the basis of
performance outcomes that are only visible at the collective or social level
of analysis. Moving beyond this, we should also perhaps be inclined to ask
whether certain kinds of socio-economic, socio-political, and (to complete the
picture) socio-technical interventions should be adopted on the grounds that
they trade collective forms of epistemic success against individual forms of
intellectual virtue.
4 Implications
4.1 The Evaluation of Epistemic Technology
In considering the way in which vice and virtue impact aspects of collective
performance, it is natural for our attention to settle on the properties of
individual human agents, for example, their cognitive capabilities. In an
epistemological context, this focus is perhaps not surprising; for it is precisely
these sorts of properties (i.e., the elements of cognitive character) that are the
primary target of virtue epistemological theorizing. In many cases, however,
epistemic goods (e.g., knowledge, true belief and understanding) are the
product of processes that involve some form of technological resource. Paler-
mos (2011) thus discusses the way in which the production of astronomical
knowledge is tied to the skilful use of a variety of technological artefacts
(e.g., telescopes). Our evaluations of positive epistemic status, in this case,
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are grounded, Palermos argues, in the way in which scientific instruments
are used to drive belief-forming processes. In attributing a scientist with
knowledge, we thus appeal to the explanatory role of a cognitive ability that
(in most real-world cases) involves the technological resource as an intrinsic
part of an extended cognitive process (see Palermos, 2011, 2015). Such forms
of epistemically-relevant bio-technological coupling are, of course, a common
feature of contemporary scientific practice. In the absence of a proper grasp
of how to use an array of increasingly sophisticated technological artefacts
and systems, it is unlikely that any scientist would be able to reliably track
the truth in their respective domain of interest.
The upshot of all this is to highlight the importance of technologies
relative to our individual and collective doxastic endeavours. In view of
this importance, it seems appropriate to subject technologies to a degree
of epistemic evaluation; i.e., it seems that we ought to judge the merits
of a particular technology based on the extent to which it enhances the
epistemic standing of its users. The problem, of course, is that with the
notion of mandevillian intelligence now at hand, it seems entirely possible
that the epistemic impact of a technology may differ depending on whether
our attention is focused on the individual or the collective level of analysis.
We can thus imagine a case in which a technology seems to work against
the epistemic interests of the individual, but which nevertheless confers an
epistemic advantage to the larger community.
To help make this a little clearer, consider the case of personalized search,
as supported by popular Internet search engines such as Google Search.
Personalized search helps to tailor search results to the interests and concerns
of a particular Internet user based on their previous history of search engine
use. The search engine is, in this case, acting as a form of bio-external
attentional filter, directing a user’s attention to those regions of the online
environment that are deemed to be of greatest interest and relevance to the
user. The danger, of course, is that this mechanism works to selectively alter
the accessibility of online information in a manner that is aligned with a set
of pre-existing interests, beliefs, and (perhaps) prejudices. As a result, we
encounter the notorious problem of ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011). These
undoubtedly limit a user’s access to epistemically-relevant information, but
they so in such a way that (at least in the worst case) ignores a range of
important epistemic desiderata, such as reliability, objectivity, credibility,
scope and truth (see Miller and Record, 2013). The concern, then, is that
personalized search exerts something of a pernicious influence on our epistemic
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standing. It is for this reason that epistemologists such as Simpson (2012) and
Miller and Record (2013) advocate changes in user behaviour and corporate
policy, potentially backed up by government intervention, as a means of
reducing the negative impact of personalized search engine technology on our
(individual) epistemic capabilities.
It is here that the notion of mandevillian intelligence helps to reshape
(or at least refocus) the nature of the epistemological debate. For even if we
accept that personalized search is, in general, injurious to an individual’s
epistemic health, this does not mean that the technology is bereft of any
kind of epistemic benefit. In particular, it is far from clear that the epistemic
consequences of search engine technology for a community of Internet users
is exactly the same as that for the individual members of the community
itself. We might, for example, claim that the use of personalized search
plays a productive role in maintaining a degree of cognitive diversity within a
community of Internet users. Such diversity, we have seen, is often crucial in
terms of enabling some collective, multi-agent ensemble to discover, resolve
or otherwise track the truth in some domain of interest. In essence, what
the notion of mandevillian intelligence gives us is a means of avoiding a rush
towards premature judgements concerning the epistemic or veritistic (see
Goldman, 1999, 2002) value of a technology. Just because a particular
technology, such as personalized search, turns out to have little or no benefit
at the level of individual agents, this does not mean that it has no benefits
tout court.11 The concept of mandevillian intelligence can thus be seen as
helping epistemologists be open-minded12 about the epistemic significance
of a technology and the kinds of interventions (e.g., government regulation)
that might be required to ensure its virtuous operation.
11This issue is of particular importance when one considers the criticisms that have
been leveled at major technology providers (e.g., Facebook and Google) by a number of
political leaders (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37798762). The main value
of mandevillian intelligence, in this respect, is that helps us see the current political
debate as epistemologically deficient. In particular, it is unclear whether the criticisms
of major technology vendors are justified in the absence of a clearer understanding of
how personalized search mechanisms affect epistemic outcomes at both the individual and
collective levels.
12The concept of mandevillian intelligence is, in this context, functioning as a kind of
cognitive scaffold that helps to support a specific form of (meta-epistemological) intellectual
virtue—one that is often deemed relevant to issues of positive epistemic standing in the
case of individual agents (see Zagzebski, 1996).
21
4.2 The Engineering of Socio-Epistemic Systems
Inasmuch as we accept the notion of mandevillian intelligence, it seems that the
epistemic consequences of a particular technology or agent property may vary
according to whether our attention is focused at the individual or collective
level. In particular, a property of an agent (e.g., dogmatism) or technology
(e.g., personal filtering) that looks to harm the epistemic standing of an
individual agent can, on occasion, play a positive role in securing epistemic
benefits at the level of social groups and socio-technical systems. This insight
has important implications for how we evaluate the properties of both agents
and the technologies they use. It also, however, alters our view as to how
we might engineer socio-technical systems so as to maximize their epistemic
potential. In particular, if we accept the claim that individual cognitive
vices can (on occasion) underwrite collective epistemic accomplishments, then
it becomes possible to entertain the (otherwise outlandish) idea of using a
technology to exploit, accentuate, or even establish(!) an individual form of
intellectual vice. This, of course, is largely counter to the way we think about
the technology design process. In most cases, the aim of technology design
is to enhance the cognitive and epistemic functioning of the individual by
addressing cognitive limitations and reducing the incidence of cognitive bias.
In fact, it seems odd (not to mention ethically questionable) to consider the
prospect of designing a technology so as to capitalize on the availability of a
form of individual cognitive vice. In general, it seems much more appropriate
to focus one’s efforts on minimizing cognitive bias rather than exploiting,
accentuating or even creating it. But what if we were to encounter a form of
cognitive bias that, while injurious to the epistemic interests of the individual,
was nevertheless able to play a productive role in ensuring epistemic success
at the collective level. In this case, we can surely ask ourselves to what extent
our technology design efforts should attempt to exploit the bias, as opposed
to always attempting to eradicate it.
What all this amounts to, I suggest, is an approach to technology develop-
ment that factors in the potential contribution of individual cognitive biases
and processing limitations as a means of promoting, supporting, or enabling
collective forms of cognitive and epistemic success. The general idea is that
we should see the cognitive vices of the individual as a form of exploitable
resource that, when situated in the right socio-technical context, can work to
the overall cognitive and epistemic good of an agent community. It is in this
sense that we can perhaps see individual cognitive vices as part of a suite of
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resources (a sort of ‘vice-kit’) that system developers can exploit as part of
their efforts to engineer socio-epistemic systems.
4.3 The Virtue-Theoretic Conception of Collective
Knowledge
Finally, we should ask to what extent the notion of mandevillian intelligence
threatens to undermine or destabilize virtue-theoretic approaches to under-
standing knowledge. Inasmuch as we view vice and virtue as apt to change as
we switch our epistemological gaze between the individual and the collective
levels, does this call into question the explanatory appeal of intellectual virtue
in accounting for the nature of knowledge? Such may be the case if we
accept that collective forms of knowledge are produced by the exercise of an
individual’s vicious intellectual character. If, for example, the true beliefs
ascribed to an epistemic group agent are seen to result from the exercise of
what, at the individual level, is regarded as an intellectual vice, then how
can virtue epistemology claim to provide a generic account of knowledge, one
that applies as much to collective forms of knowledge as it does to the sorts
of knowledge ascribed to individual agents?
In order to help us appreciate what is at stake, here, consider how we
might seek to develop a virtue theoretic conception of so-called collective
doxastic agents (Goldman, 2011) or epistemic group agents (Palermos and
Pritchard, 2013; Palermos, 2015). In general, analyses of intellectual virtue
have focused on individual agents and paid little attention to how notions of
intellectual virtue might be applied to groups of individuals. An exception is
an important body of work by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). They suggest
that we can understand attributions of group-level knowledge (i.e., the claim
that a group of agents, such as a scientific team, ‘knows’ that p) from a
virtue theoretic perspective. In particular, they suggest that we should see
group-level or collective knowledge as resulting from the exercise of cognitive
abilities that are ascribed to the group as a whole:
...the collective cognitive success of believing the truth of some (sci-
entific) proposition will...be significantly creditable to the group’s
cognitive agency (i.e., the set of organismic cognitive faculties of
its individual members). (p. 115)
It is here that we encounter a potential problem. This is revealed by
the fact that what Palermos and Pritchard (2013) are seeking to do is use
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an epistemic condition that was formulated in the context of individualistic
analytic virtue epistemology in order to pin down the epistemic standing of
a collective epistemic entity. The danger, of course, is that it is all too easy
to fall into the trap of assuming that individual forms of intellectual virtue
are necessary to account for collective knowledge. In the case of mandevillian
intelligence, recall, it is individual vice that lies at the root of collective forms
of epistemic success. While Palermos and Pritchard stop short of claiming
that the cognitive faculties of the group members need be of the virtuous
variety, it is clearly tempting, given their appeal to a virtue-theoretic epistemic
condition, to see the epistemic status of groups as grounded in the same sort
of cognitive abilities (i.e., intellectual virtues) as those that determine the
validity of epistemic attributions made in the case of individual agents. It
should, however, be clear that this kind of claim is called into question by the
notion of mandevillian intelligence. In particular, we should not assume that
collective forms of intellectual virtue are necessarily rooted in the exercise of
individual forms of intellectual virtue. Instead, the thing that makes some
collective cognitive trait or cognitive faculty a virtue (i.e., the thing that
makes a collective cognitive trait or faculty reliable) may very well turn out
to be a cognitive trait or faculty that, at the individual level, has a much
more vice-like feel to it.
The extent to which all of this presents a problem for virtue epistemology is,
for the present at least, unclear. Inasmuch as epistemologists accept the notion
of mandevillian intelligence, it seems they should avoid committing to the idea
that collective knowledge is founded on individual forms of intellectual virtue.
Even if this sort of claim has not (as yet) been made by the epistemological
community, it is important to be aware of some of the theoretical pitfalls that
might lie on the philosophical road ahead.
5 Conclusion
Mandevillian intelligence is a form of collective intelligence in which individual
cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role
in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. Transposed to the
epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that
individual forms of intellectual vice can, on occasion, play a productive role in
improving the epistemic performance of a multi-agent ensemble (e.g., a socio-
epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent or an epistemic group agent).
24
This, it should be clear, marks out an important area of the epistemological
terrain that is of common interest to those working in virtue epistemology
(Greco and Turri, 2012), social epistemology (Goldman and Whitcomb, 2011)
and applied epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming). In particular,
the notion of mandevillian intelligence forces us to question the extent to
which individual cognitive shortcomings should always be denigrated as forms
of intellectual vice. While such shortcomings may often work against the
epistemic interests of the individual agent, they may, when situated in a
collective context, play a crucial role in enabling an epistemic community
to track the truth in a reliable manner. This has potentially profound
implications for the way we think about the epistemic value of a broad range of
social and technological interventions. For example, it is now unclear whether
we should view a specific kind of technology (e.g., personalized search) as of
limited epistemic value simply because it undermines the epistemic standing
of individual agents. In some cases, it seems that a specific technology may
work to the collective epistemic good of a community while simultaneously
jeopardizing the epistemic standing of the community’s constituent members.
This sort of conflict, with epistemic enhancement at one level implying
epistemic diminishment at the other, may very well serve as a point of tension
when it comes to the theoretical merger of virtue epistemology with social
epistemology (see Palermos and Pritchard, 2013). It also, no doubt, serves
as a potent form of dialectical fodder for those who are concerned with the
application of epistemological theorizing to real-world situations (see Chase
and Coady, forthcoming).
All this should help to convince us of the relevance of mandevillian in-
telligence to contemporary epistemology. Clearly, much more work needs
to be done to evaluate the notion of mandevillian intelligence. It will, in
particular, be important to develop a better understanding of the sorts of
situations in which individual vice contributes to collective virtue. It will also
be important to undertake studies that reveal something about the nature
of the processes involved in translating individual vice into collective virtue.
Even in the absence of these studies, however, the notion of mandevillian
intelligence can play an important role in highlighting a host of issues that
lie at the interface of the epistemological sub-disciplines of virtue, social and
applied epistemology. It is for this reason, I suggest, that the notion of man-
devillian intelligence is worthy of further consideration by the epistemological
community.
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